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ESSAY
Ethics and the Law School: The Confusion Persists
PETER K. ROFES*
Why we should not be surprised when a former student calls to ask why a
grievance has been filed against him just because he borrowed money from his
firm's client trust account to purchase property in the Caribbean.
The American law school discovered ethics at about the same time the
rest of America discovered how rare a commodity ethics was in our national
leaders, most of whom happened to be lawyers. In fact, despite trailblazing
work by scholars such as Monroe Freedman, Geoffrey Hazard, and others,
it is no stretch of the historical record to conclude that the place and
status of ethics in the law school owes more to Richard Nixon and his
three legal Johns (Dean, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell) than to any law
professor.'
Yet, two decades after the culmination of Watergate, the law school
remains confused about the role ethics plays in its mission of preparing
students for practice. At first-year orientation, representatives of most
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. B.A. Brandeis, A.M. Harvard,
J.D. Columbia. This Essay is part of a larger project underway in which I explore (in much the same
vein as this Essay explores ethics in the law school) a host of aspects of the American law school,
among them the admissions process, the classroom, the final examination, grades, a day in the life of
a law professor, the role of the Constitution, the job interview, multiculturalism, the faculty meeting,
and the graduation speech. As for acknowledgements, candor impels me to disclose that, with one
exception, none of my colleagues at Marquette has offered anything but scorn for the project. The
one exception is a colleague who has offered what can best be described as derision rather than
scorn. I remain grateful nonetheless for their collegiality, congeniality, and conviviality.
1. As Harry Jones noted, it was in the summer of 1974 - the summer of the resignation - that
the American Bar Association amended its standards to require all accredited law schools to offer
mandatory instruction in what has come to be called professional responsibility. Harry W. Jones,
Lawyers and Justice: The Uneasy Ethics of Partisanship, 23 VILL. L. REV. 957, 958-59 (1978). See also
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1, 2-3 (1975)
(discussing John Dean's testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee and indicating that Dean
"had been struck by the fact" that so many of the Watergate conspirators had been lawyers); Donald
T. Weckstein, Watergate and the Law Schools, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 261, 261 (1975) (discussing the
same testimony). As an aside, I do not mean to minimize the roles played by Gordon Liddy and
Donald Segretti, each of whom - at the time Watergate broke - also had a license to practice law.
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American law schools tell incoming students that the development of
ethical lawyers is central to their mission. At graduation, these same
representatives tell the newest members of the profession how diligently the
schools have worked to mold ethical lawyers. But the events that unfold in
the thirty-three months or so between these announcements reveal a gap
between words and deeds, a gap rooted in confusion, uncertainty, and a lack
of consensus about what teaching ethics is all about. This Essay addresses
three manifestations of that confusion.
One manifestation of the confusion is that law schools are deeply divided
over what to call the package of stuff that they deliver in this area.
Contracts, Torts, Property, Criminal Law, Constitutional Law - few in the
law school quibble about what to call each of these bodies of legal principles
or the basic course in each body. When it comes to ethics, however, the
consensus suddenly breaks down.
Many schools opt to call this body of rules and regulations "Legal Ethics"
- a stately, serious, upstanding name intended to send students a pair of
strikingly inconsistent messages. The "Legal" in "Legal Ethics" seeks to
appeal to the practical, gung-ho segment of the student body, the student
who knew she wanted to be a lawyer from the time she slapped a nuisance
suit on the kids next door because they screeched and wailed whenever their
parents left them with a baby-sitter. Well aware that students such as these
might fall asleep in a required course about the ethics of plumbers or
veterinarians, the law school uses the term "Legal" to say to these students:
"Hey, Folks: this course is about you - stop snoring and pay attention."
The "Ethics" is meant to appeal to an altogether different kind of student,
the student who studied philosophy as an undergraduate and believes deep
down that she is smarter than all her peers because, unlike them, she knows
that Soren Kierkegaard and Jean Jacques Rousseau are not two National
Hockey League rookies. The law school invokes the term "Ethics" to say to
these intellectually refined students: "Listen up, boys and girls, because this
course is more meaningful than the rest of the dreck we've required you to
take so far. Trust us."
Other schools choose the title "Professional Responsibility" - lofty,
pervasive, practical. Here again we see an appeal to different student
interests. The term "Professional" is used to energize the student who looks
forward to a lucrative career doing what professionals do best: billing clients
vast sums for services never - or poorly - rendered and defrauding the
Internal Revenue Service by claiming the cost of personal travel, meals, and
magazine subscriptions as expenses incurred for the production of income.
The term "Responsibility" is used to attract the interest of a very different
kind of student, the student who begins her professional career believing
[Vol. 8:981
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that a telephone call from a client seeking to learn about developments in
his case should be returned, preferably within six months.2
A second manifestation of confusion concerns the number of credit hours
the basic course in Legal Ethics should be allotted.
Many law schools, evidently a majority of those accredited by the Ameri-
can Bar Association, continue to allocate two credit hours to the required
course in Legal Ethics.3 A two-credit required course is a law school's way of
delivering a quintessential mixed message, a way of saying to students:
"Hey, you really should be exposed to this stuff before we give you a degree
because it's terribly important, but don't fret: we don't expect you to learn
much of it." Empirical studies indicate that recent graduates of schools
devoting only two credits to the basic course in Legal Ethics disproportion-
ately lash out at their adversaries with suggestions of some truly difficult
acts,4 perhaps because the two-credit course is unable to cover issues of
professional civility in any depth.5
A minority of schools allocate three or more credit hours to the course.
These schools send students a different but equally clear message: "Don't
bother suing us for educational malpractice when you get caught converting
client funds. We spent an entire class session warning you not to do that."
The data mentioned above indicate that graduates of schools devoting three
credits or more to Legal Ethics get into trouble no less often than their
peers. The difference is that when these lawyers commit ethical breaches,
they do so with calculated enthusiasm rather than through carelessness or
stupidity.
In addition to the confusion about what name to assign the basic course in
Legal Ethics and how many hours students should devote to it, disagree-
2. In addition to the pair of names discussed in the text, two others round out the field. One is
"Legal Profession." The other is "The Rules and Regulations That Should Keep You From Doing
All the Things You Never Should Have Been Doing in the First Place." Each reflects pretty much an
exclusive appeal to the practical-minded members of the student body. Because these names fit my
thesis a bit less snugly, I have taken the scholarly prerogative to ignore them entirely.
3. The information set forth in this paragraph has been gathered from a series of informal
conversations with teachers of Legal Ethics held over drinks at recent conferences of the American
Association of Law Schools and the American Bar Association.
4. Think about it.
5. Please do no misunderstand. I make no pretensions to having actually examined those
empirical studies to ascertain whether they support the propositions set forth above. After all, that's
what research assistants and law librarians are paid to do. As a matter of fact, I have surprisingly
little evidence to support the statement that the empirical studies even exist, evidence that amounts
to not much more than my intuitive sense that empirical studies of one sort or another exist to
support pretty much every proposition that a contemporary law professor wishes to support.
Accordingly, I am confident that such studies, were they in existence, would support the proposition.
And, hey, even if they were not (or did not), I would represent that they were (and did). After all, I
have tenure.
1995]
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ment exists about the core material to be taught in this required course -
the third manifestation of confusion addressed in this Essay.6 A recent
examination of law school catalogues reveals two dominant approaches to
course coverage.
The first approach - the more traditional - is typified by the following





Two (2) [Three (3)] Credit Hours
An in-depth examination of the law governing the legal profession and the
practice of law. Principal topics include: the regulation of the profession -
why it can prove dangerous to lie to bar admission authorities, tell the
state disciplinary agency that you just haven't had time to respond to its
inquiry, or fail to make a premium payment on your malpractice policy;
the lawyer-client relationship - focus on the allocation of decision-making
and disparity of power between lawyer and client, with special emphasis
on the need for lawyers to refrain from comments such as "Of course I can
help you out, darling; after all, you're a woman and I'm a man" in the
preliminary interview with a prospective client; the duty of confidentiality-
advice on how lawyers can avoid situations like those in which they find
themselves at parties saying things to local reporters such as "Hell, yes -
of course my client kidnapped the kid. He told me that the first time we
met"; conflicts of interests and the duty of loyalty - why drafters of rules of
conduct recommend that, notwithstanding economic efficiencies, a lawyer
be discouraged from representing both plaintiff and defendant in the
typical civil case; ethical issues in litigation - analysis of the risks con-
nected with advising a client that testimony about to be given by him is
technically not perjury because the jury suspects he's not telling the truth
anyway; and the delivery of legal services - an assessment of the pros and
cons of introducing yourself to a bleeding accident victim with the words
"Hurry, sign this before you expire. Your survivors will love you for it."
This description suggests that the approach to be pursued is one that seeks
to prepare lawyers for practice by arming them with knowledge of the law
governing the legal profession. As one example, a student exposed to the
kind of materials suggested by this description is likely to begin law practice
able to distinguish between a client trust account, on the one hand, and her
own personal checking or money market account, on the other. This can prove a
useful distinction for the practicing lawyer to grasp early in her career.
6. To put this point in the current language of American law professors, there exists a dispute
about what "the canon" of legal ethics is and ought to be.
[Vol. 8:981
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The second approach to the course is captured by the following descrip-
tion. A variation of this approach likewise can be found at many schools,




Two (2) [Three (3)] Credit Hours
A leisurely frolic through novels, films, comic strips, and other aspects of
American culture that touch on lawyers and the legal profession. Our goal
will be to identify and explore the ethical problems most often encoun-
tered by fictional lawyers, regardless of whether non-fictional, real-world,
flesh-and-blood lawyers of today encounter issues even remotely con-
nected to those we will discuss. Students are on notice that the body of law
that will govern their conduct as lawyers will not be a concern of this
course. Instead, the course seeks to achieve a relaxed, pleasurable, and
aesthetic experience, leading to rich, meaningful conversations and high
student evaluations. Those students seeking to learn the petty details of
the disciplinary system, conflicts of interests, confidentiality, and the like
are urged to opt instead for an appropriate bar review course. Materials
include works by Charles Dickens, Erle Stanley Gardner, Harper Lee,
John Grisham, Scott Turow, Berkeley Breathed, and Garry Trudeau and
the films Adam's Rib, A Night at the Opera, The Fortune Cookie, Cad-
dyshack, A Fish Called Wanda, and My Cousin Vinny. Choice of espresso,
cappuccino, or cafe latte with each session.
The approach reflected in this description reveals the disdain with which
the particular school or professor views the traditional course in Legal
Ethics. In contrast to the traditional course, this approach prepares stu-
dents for the ethical problems of law practice not by studying rules of
conduct, judicial decisions, or advisory opinions but by exploring the
captivating and multi-textured world of literary and cinematic legal heroes.
Students who make their way through a course such as this will develop a
refined understanding of some of western culture's most prominent fictional
lawyers. But they probably will come away having learned little about the
application of RICO to lawyers and law firms.
In the American law school as elsewhere, consensus need not always be a
virtue, and the absence of it need not always be a vice.7 Yet the confu-
7. For the figure of speech in which this observation has been cloaked, I am indebted to Barry
Goldwater. It was Goldwater who, at the 1964 Republican convention in San Francisco, etched his
name into rhetorical history with the following observation: "I would remind you that extremism in
the defense of liberty is no vice! And let me remind you also that moderation in pursuit of justice is
no virtue!" Barry M. Goldwater, Acceptance Speech in San Francisco, Cal. (July 17, 1964) in
CAMPAIGN SPEECHES OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 1948-1984, at 134, 141 (Gregory
Bush ed., 1985).
1995]
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sion within American legal education about the role ethics plays in the
development of lawyers continues to wreak substantial harm. Students
attending a school that calls the required course "Legal Ethics" or "Legal
Profession" have a difficult time ascertaining whether a canned outline
entitled "Professional Responsibility" is applicable to their class. Students
attending a school at which the required course is only two credit hours feel
bitterness and resentment that peers around the nation have the opportu-
nity to develop a more refined understanding of the law governing lawyers.
Students exposed to the more traditional course coverage worry that their
failure to study the techniques of fictional lawyers such as Whiplash Willie
Gingrich8 will diminish their chances for professional success.
Two decades after Watergate, it is time for the American law school to
speak with one voice about the role of ethics in the development of
American lawyers.
8. For the benefit of readers unfamiliar with classic films about lawyers and the legal profession,
allow me to explain this reference. The Fortune Cookie, Billy Wilder's 1966 gem, stars Jack Lemmon
as Harry Hinkle, a television cameraman for CBS who experiences an unexpected meeting with a
punt returner for the Cleveland Browns. That meeting prompts Hinkle's personal injury lawyer
brother-in-law, played by Walter Matthau, to see dollar signs - big green dollar signs. Whiplash
Willie Gingrich, Matthau's character, sues pretty much everyone in sight-CBS, the Browns,
Cleveland Municipal Stadium, etc.-in hopes of a recovery that, to indulge in understatement,
exceeds the compensatory damages incurred by Hinkle. Matthau's performance, his first with
Lemmon, earned him the Academy Award for Best Supporting Actor.
[Vol. 8:981
